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Windows Vista: Securing itself 
against competition?
Georg Erber and Stefan Kooths
About the end of 2006, Microsoft began delivering its new Windows Vista 
PC operating system to large commercial customers, followed by final us-
ers and small businesses. Even before the product reached the market, the 
dominant provider of PC operating systems worldwide was accused over 
and over of abusing its market power in order to hinder competitors. After 
the integration of Internet Explorer (Windows 95) and the Windows Me-
dia Player (Windows XP), competitors today are objecting most strongly to 
the new security components associated with the Windows Vista Security 
Center, and the EU Commission has joined in these objections. Opponents 
have criticized the bundling of previously independent components (trans-
fer of market power through bundling), and security software providers 
like Symantec and McAfee have argued that limiting access to the core of 
the operating system will hinder their product development activities. In 
line with the tradition in EU competition policy, Microsoft‘s dominance 
of the PC operating system market justifies supervision of that provider in 
the interests of preventing abuse. However, the final assessment must take 
into account unique circumstances arising from the specific market and 
competitive conditions in the standard software markets.
In particular, competition policy should intervene in the PC operating sys-
tem market only if a demonstrable improvement in the public welfare can 
be attained as a result. In essence, this means that policymakers should in-
tervene to ensure fair innovation competition, including the introduction 
of reasonable transparency requirements with respect to operating system 
interfaces in order to allow regulators to manage potential conflicts be-
tween the operating system manufacturer and providers of competing soft-
ware components (e.g. web browsers, media players or security software). 
There is need for reform in this area in order to create a reliable and func-
tional system of rules for all market participants. However, unbundling 
decrees which require strict separation of certain system components are 
an unsuitable instrument for this purpose.
JEL classification: K21, L41, L42, L63 
Keywords: competition policy, Microsoft, operating system markets, platform competi-
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The global PC operating system 
market: Microsoft’s dominance intact
The total number of personal computers (PCs) world-
wide is currently about one billion,1 and estimates in-
dicate that another 1.3 billion computers will be built 
between 2006 and 2010,2 60% more than in the first 
half of the decade. With a market share of over 90%, 
Microsoft has dominated the PC operating system 
for about two decades through its various Windows 
products (Figure 1).3
Apple is its only statistically noticeable competi-
tor, with a market share of 5%. Linux and other op-
erating systems, on the other hand, account for just 
around 1% of the market. Microsoft expects its new 
Windows Vista operating system to sell about 100 
million licenses worldwide in 2007. A major percent-
age of these sales will come through the “OEM” busi-
1   Since the beginning of the PC era in 1981, 1.54 billion units 
have been sold, of which 850 million are less than five years old; 
cf. Computer Industry Almanac 25-Year PC Anniversary Statistics: 
www.c-i-a.com./pr0806.htm
2   Cf. Computer Industry Almanac: Cumulative PC Sales Over 
Next Five Years: www.c-i-a.com./pr0606.htm
3   The market shares reported by Net Applications (marketshare.
hitslink.com) are based on the evaluation of website hits and the-
refore reflect actual user behavior, although only computers with 
internet access can be counted, of course (which comprise about 
60% of the installed base). Other studies, which are based on sales 
data, come to very similar conclusions as to the market shares of 
Windows product lines.
ness,4 in which manufacturers supply customers with 
new computers featuring pre-installed operating sys-
tems. The average PC replacement cycle is currently 
three to four years in the US,5 and the number should 
be similar in other industrialized countries. Since the 
transition  to  a  new  operating  system  usually  goes 
hand in hand with the hardware upgrade cycle, it is 
expected that Windows XP will largely be replaced 
by the new Vista version within that time period.
Due to the consistently high growth in the PC mar-
ket, especially in developing countries like China and 
India, the number of PC operating system licenses 
is clearly on the rise. In the case of China, this trend 
should be reinforced by the fact that those purchas-
ing PCs in the future will have to furnish documen-
tation that they have obtained an operating system 
license, as an anti-piracy measure.6
4   OEM = Original Equipment Manufacturer
5   Cf. Dunn, D.: The PC Replacement Decision. In: Information-
Week of 20 June 2005.
6   Batson, A.: China makes progress on curbing piracy. In: Wall 
Street Journal of 27 November 2006. The software industry cur-
rently  estimates  worldwide  losses  due  to  piracy  at  around  one 
third of total sales. With USD 98 billion in total sales in 2005, the 
loss therefore amounts to around USD 34 billion. Only 65% of in-
stalled software worldwide is lawfully acquired. Western Europe‘s 
piracy rate is average, Germany‘s is well below-average (27%) and 
Eastern Europe (69%) is the piracy leader, ahead of Latin America, 
with 68%, and the Asia-Pacific region, with 54%. Cf. BSA & IDC: 
Third Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study, May 
2006: www.bsa.org/germany/.
Figure 1:
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Market power in standard software 
markets not surprising
In view of Microsoft’s dominant position in the global 
market, it would appear that regulators are justified 
in devoting more attention to that provider. However, 
standard software markets have unique features, so 
that competition policy models which may be accept-
able for traditional markets are not necessarily appli-
cable (see box). The specific market conditions arise 
above all from the interplay of
•	 high development costs;
•	 non-rivalry in consumption; and
•	 direct and indirect network effects.
These features are especially significant in operat-
ing system markets.
Box
Market leadership and consumer use
Figure 2 – Box
Market shares of Word and Excel in 













Source: Liebowitz and Margolis, 2001
Figure 1 – Box
Price trend in PC software markets 
with and without Microsoft as a 
competitor








1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
No competition with Microsoft1
Normal competition with Microsoft2
Direct competition 
with Microsoft3
1 recordkeeping, graphics programs, formula generators, 
high-end desktop publishing
2 mid-range desktop publishing, personal financial 
management, presentation graphics, spreadsheets, word 
processing, database and project management, Office 
packages
3 PC operating systems, utilities, communication 
programs
Source: Liebowitz and Margolis, 2001
In a study of Microsoft’s role in standard software markets, Liebowitz and Margolis1 used empirical Dataquest data to investigate 
the effects of Microsoft’s entry into the market on consumer welfare, to which end they analyzed the price and quality trend of the 
competing software products. The qualitative comparison revealed that Microsoft, after a few years, was able to offer a product of 
comparable or higher quality than those of its competitors.
After Microsoft attained market leadership, there were no price increases of any kind, as might have been expected using a 
monopoly pricing model. Instead, price remained well below those of comparison markets (Figure 1).
According to Liebowitz and Margolis, the success of the word processing (MS Word) and spreadsheet applications (MS Excel) 
was not based on the shifting of market power from the operating system market. Instead, those Microsoft applications already 
had high market shares for the Apple operating system, which spread only gradually to the version for Microsoft’s own operating 
systems (Figure 2).
1 Liebowitz, S.J., Margolis, S.E.: Winners, Losers & Microsoft- Competition and Antitrust in High Technology, 2nd ed., Oakland, CA, 
2001.
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The cost of software production runs in similar 
patterns to those in other R&D-intensive industries 
(e.g. the pharmaceutical and film industries). High 
development costs (first copy costs) are paralleled by 
negligible marginal costs for distribution to final con-
sumers. The higher the number of licenses sold, the 
lower the individual license price needs to be in order 
to cover overall costs. If a software developer can ex-
pect to sell large quantities of a new product thanks 
to a large customer base and high customer loyalty, 
it will be in a position to invest much more heavily in 
product development. The mere fact that a dominant 
company is able to invest more in product develop-
ment reduces the incentive for potential competitors 
to engage in direct innovation competition, even if 
general technological capacities are equal.7
Since software, as a result of its physical proper-
ties, can be installed over and over again and can be 
used by different users, there is non-rivalry in con-
sumption.  Without  effective  copy  protection,  free-
loading practices would proliferate among users and 
providers would be unable to achieve the cost de-
gression effects of a large user base. Therefore, only 
the availability of low-cost copy protection methods 
can ensure that software will become a marketable 
commodity.
User groups can derive advantages in the form of 
direct and indirect network effects.8 Direct network ef-
fects result if use of a program is beneficial for the 
very fact that many other users are also using it (e.g. 
greater ease in exchanging data and switching work-
stations).  Indirect  network  effects  arise  from  the 
availability of complementary products and services, 
e.g. in the form of applications. Featuring pronounced 
network effects on both the supply and demand sides, 
operating system markets have the characteristics of 
a “two-sided market”: the challenge for operating sys-
tem providers is to unite third-party providers9 and 
users on their platform.10 The value of that platform 
7    Scherer,  F.M.:  International  High-Technology  Competition. 
Cambridge, MA, 1992 Kamien, M.I., Schwartz, N.L.: Market Struc-
ture and Innovation, Cambridge, MA, 1982
8   Cf. Farrell, J. Klemperer, P: Coordination and Lock-in: Com-
petition  with  Switching  Costs  and  Network  Effects,  May  2006; 
www.paulklemperer.org; Liebowitz, S.J., Margolis, S.E.: Network 
Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy. In: Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1994, 133-150, and Erber C, Hagemann, H: 
Economics of Networks. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (ed.): Frontiers in 
Economics, 2002, 235-368
9   Including independent software vendors (ISVs) and IT service 
providers  which  perform  installation,  support  and  training  ser-
vices.
10   Cf. Rochet, J-C, Tirole, J: Platform Competition in Two-sided 
Markets. In: Journal of the European Economic Association, June 
2003, 990-1029, or Bresnahan, T.F., Greenstein, S: Technological 
for users increases with every application developed 
or service provided by third-party providers for the 
platform (diversity of supply). At the same time, an 
operating system platform becomes more attractive 
for third-party providers when more users decide to 
use it (market size).
In  view  of  the  high  first-copy  costs  and  pro-
nounced network effects, it is hardly surprising from 
an  economic  perspective  that  a  dominant  provider 
has emerged on the PC operating system market, 
even without an abuse of market power.
Innovation competition for the market 
as a whole
The past success of Microsoft, whose business mod-
el focuses on standard software markets with high 
user numbers,11 is not by itself sufficient evidence of 
the abuse of market power. Competition in standard 
software markets takes place not so much in the mar-
ket as for the market. Alternative products seeking to 
compete with an established software platform can 
only succeed if the added benefit attainable to con-
sumers exceeds the cost of switching over the long 
term.12 This essentially requires new products (e.g. 
software architectures like Web 2.0, or other licens-
ing forms like open source software). In that case, 
the existing provider would lose its customer base 
and the dominant position would pass to the innova-
tor (“winner takes all”). Due to the shifts associated 
with each technological advance, the software indus-
try is characterized by a succession of dominant pro-
viders. Therefore, competition in software markets 
typically amounts to innovation competition for the 
market for the duration of a given technology. In the 
case of such technological paradigm changes, domi-
nant market positions are not necessarily secured by 
existing market penetration.13 Thus far, however, Mi-
Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry. In: The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 47, 1999, 1-40
11   Microsoft currently earns over 80% of its income and almost 
60% of its revenue from its operating systems and Office applica-
tions; cf. Laube, H., Ottomeier, M.: Office tritt gegen Vorläufer an. 
In: Financial Times Deutschland of 27 November 2006, 6.
12   However, business from new customers from the expanding 
software markets in developing countries like China and India es-
sentially offers competitors the opportunity to gain a critical mass 
of customers who would not incur any cost for switching operating 
systems.
13    Christensen,  C.M.:  The  Innovator‘s  Dilemma,  Cambridge, 
MA,  1997;  Adner,  R.:  When  are  technologies  disruptive?  A  de-
mand-based view on the emergence of competition. In: Strategic 
Management Journal, 2002, Vol. 23, 667-688DIW Berlin Weekly Report No 2/200   11
crosoft has been able to withstand such shifts, due in 
no small part to its massive development efforts.
Potential competition no empty phrase
Changes  in  IT  and  communications  technology, 
driven by a growth in broadband communication in-
frastructure, are creating new uses for the internet. 
These new fields depend on software technologies 
which are compatible with various platforms and are 
based on open standards and protocols, thus allowing 
a more decentralized self-organization on the part of 
users.
In recent times, technological access hurdles for 
the exchange of multi-media content have been low-
ered  considerably  thanks  to  user-friendly  software 
environments. In addition, a large part of the software 
needed to transport digital content for this purpose is 
already fully integrated in the interactive applications 
of web services like Wikipedia, Youtube and Flickr. 
Users transport their private content from their ter-
minal devices to the web service provider through 
the respective browser interface.
While the terminal device’s operating system re-
tains control over the terminal device itself, it has no 
control over the administration of the web services, 
i.e.  the  content  level  of  internet  communications, 
which is controlled by the relevant web service. In 
the traditional PC universe, the operating system had 
complete control over all activities, including appli-
cations. New developments make it easier for users 
to switch operating systems. For example, Google’s 
Web 2.0 model no longer requires any specific operat-
ing system, thus posing a direct threat to Microsoft’s 
business model.14
Bundling software functions does not 
necessarily impair competition
Software innovations are undertaken in order to cre-
ate more user-friendly products, as well as to improve 
performance and add functions, and operating sys-
tems are no exception. In view of Microsoft’s domi-
nant market position, however, the addition of new 
functions to the Windows operating system is often 
seen not as a desirable product advance but as ver-
tical integration of associated markets by a market-
14   Cf. Nach IBM haben wir jetzt die Google-Ära. In: FAZ, No. 270 
of 20 November 2006, 21
dominant company (bundling). In fact, the addition of 
new functions gives the operating system provider ad-
vantages over manufacturers whose business model 
consists of offering those functions as supplementary 
components of the operating system. In particular, 
competitive advantages through bundling arise from 
the fact that cost degression effects can be fully ap-
plied to the market for supplementary components.
Nevertheless, the view that adding functions to 
the  Windows  operating  system  can  be  interpreted 
only as an anti-competitive bundling strategy is over-
simplified.15  Component  manufacturers  may  retain 
competitive opportunities if their innovativeness con-
tinues to give them a technological advantage or if 
their product is better suited to certain user groups. 
In such a case, the operating system provider’s bun-
dling strategy has the effect not of reducing the in-
centive  to  innovate,  but  of  diverting  this  incentive 
into the development of products which supplement 
the operating system or which improve the quality 
of its components. This may certainly occur with the 
object of becoming part of the next-generation oper-
ating system themselves through subsequent sale of 
the technology to the platform provider.16 Therefore, 
intervention by competition policymakers with the 
object of unbundling the operating system is of du-
bious value as a method of regulating software mar-
kets.
Moreover, the purpose of competition policy is not 
to protect specific markets and business models. In 
particular, acting to prohibit bundling for the protec-
tion of independent component manufacturers would 
discriminate against companies whose strategy is to 
seek acquisition by the operating system provider.
Experience  with  the  EU  Commission’s  decrees 
with respect to the unbundling of Media Player and 
Windows XP has shown that the optional separation 
of supplementary functions from the rest of the op-
erating system is ineffective without also regulating 
prices; the negligible market share of the unbundled 
operating  system  (Windows  XP/N)  demonstrates 
that this product clearly does not meet the specifica-
tions of the vast majority of consumers. Regulating the 
price of individual system components, on the other 
hand, would overburden regulators and the intensity 
of the intervention would be unjustified. Therefore, 
there is good reason not to regulate prices. As this 
15    Cf.  S.  Kooths:  Die  Unbundling-Entscheidung  im  EU-Wettbe-
werbsverfahren gegen Microsoft. In: HWWA Wirtschaftsdienst. 5th 
ed., 2005, 335 et al.
16   Cf. Croson, D., Saunders A.: Composition and Cooperation 
in the Bundled Software Market, WISE Conference Paper, 2004, 
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leaves the overall unbundling regulation 
toothless and because there are serious 
other economic arguments against it, un-
bundling software packages should not be 
considered a suitable instrument to regu-
late the software industry.
Operating system openness: 
conflict between independent 
software providers and 
Microsoft
Although  dominant  software  providers 
with platform properties are much more 
vulnerable  to  potential  competition  and 
technological changes than is the case in 
physical  network  markets  (e.g.  gas  and 
power grids), dominant platform produc-
ers do hold considerable market power as 
long as the current technology is in use. 
This is particularly true for Microsoft, as 
provider  of  the  Windows  operating  sys-
tem. Accordingly, it is necessary from the 
perspective of competition policy to ensure platform 
access for independent software manufacturers. Con-
flicts may be expected in cases where the platform 
provider is itself a manufacturer of user software, and 
can therefore obtain an unfair competitive advantage 
through  the  use  of  undocumented  functions.  This 
would suggest regulating access by imposing reason-
able transparency requirements with respect to Win-
dows interfaces.
However, the resulting conflict with the protection 
of the platform manufacturer’s intellectual property 
is a problem for which no satisfactory solution has 
been presented so far, since there is a fine line be-
tween interface documentation and giving away tech-
nology. Moreover, there is disagreement as to what 
precisely  is  to  be  understood  by  “documentation,” 
and what form it is to take. These problems are es-
pecially clear in connection with the current dispute 
involving security components of Windows Vista, as 
those components touch the very core of the operat-
ing system.
Current dispute: security software
Around US-Dollar 2.5 billion in revenue was gener-
ated worldwide from security software in 2005 and 
existing estimates expect the market volume to more 
or less double through 2009.17 Due to the variety of 
potential threats, security problems are becoming in-
creasingly complex. Viruses, Trojan Horses, worms 
and spyware (“malware”) destroy or manipulate data 
and allow unauthorized persons to access sensitive 
data. Because such attacks may result in consider-
able financial losses, the willingness of consumers to 
pay for security programs is high, opening up attrac-
tive growth and profit opportunities for businesses 
specializing in this area.
Since  partial  security  solutions  offer  protection 
only against individual types of malware, integrated 
system  solutions  (UTM:  Unified  Threat  Manage-
ment) are becoming ever more attractive. As a re-
sult, the growing computer security problems have 
led to a situation in which the UTM software market 
has grown faster than the market as a whole. This 
circumstance  clearly  reflects  the  preference  for 
17   Kolodgy, C. J.: Worldwide Threat Management Security Ap-
pliances  2005-2009  Forecast  and  2004  Vendor  Shares:  Security 
Appliances Remain a Well-Oiled Machine. IDC Study No. 33997, 
September 2005, www.fortinet.com/news/IDC/33997.htm
Figure 2
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complete  solutions  which  allow 
secure  network  operations  and 
are more difficult to circumvent 
(Figure 2).
Since  all  input  and  output 
operations carry the potential of 
malware penetration, such inter-
faces are regarded by PC operat-
ing system designers as well as 
a decisive starting point for inte-
grated security architecture. As a 
result, they must be closely inte-
grated with the operating system, 
as is the case with Vista. The IT 
and  communications  industry 
has  therefore  created  a  global 
consortium,  the  Trusted  Com-
puter Group,18 including leading 
international software and hard-
ware  manufacturers  like  Micro-
soft and Intel, in order to develop 
a  security  concept  for  trusted 
computing  and  communication 
applicable to all platforms.
The  UTM  software  market 
is  still  relatively  fragmented.  Eleven  providers  ac-
counted for about 90% of global revenue in 2004, of 
which the three largest were Fortinet, with 18.1%, 
Symantec, with 17.8% and Secure Computing, with 
14.2% (Figure 3). Microsoft’s entry into the market 
with its new Windows Vista operating system, featur-
ing integrated security solutions,19 may generate a 
shift in favor of Microsoft if Microsoft’s security tech-
nology proves to be at least as effective as that of its 
competitors. If that happens, competitors would still 
have the opportunity to convince Vista users of the 
superiority of their security technologies. While they 
have maintained that this would require access to the 
core of the operating system, allowing such access 
would conflict with Microsoft’s interest in preventing 
other programs from accessing this core, for security 
reasons. Moreover, some security software provid-
ers apparently have had no problem integrating their 
products into the new operating system.20 
18   Cf. the TCG website, www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home, 
as well as a brief history of the TCG and a description of its goals 
and  functions  at  de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing_
Group (viewed on 4 January 2007).
19   These include the Defender program to protect against mal-
ware (spyware, adware, dialers, etc.), a new firewall, a program to 
protect the core of the operating system (PatchGuard) and the re-
newed Security Center, as a console which can be used to manage 
the various security components of the operating system.
20   Sophos: Hersteller hätten sich besser auf Vista vorbereiten sollen, 
Conclusion
Highly concentrated markets for standard software 
are  not  sufficient  evidence  of  inadequate  competi-
tion. Even a company which has dominated the PC 
operating system market as much as Microsoft has 
is not free from competition, and is continually chal-
lenged by technological changes which threaten its 
core business. The charges of unfair hindrance of 
competitors which were made in the course of the 
launch of Windows Vista are, upon closer examina-
tion, by no means as clear as they may appear at first 
glance. In fact, this case exemplifies the urgent need 
to develop an adequate competition policy framework 
in order to accommodate innovation competition in 
highly dynamic markets.21
The convergence of markets, such as results in 
the case of Windows Vista from the merging of the 
Sphos sieht keine Benachteiligung durch Microsoft. In: Sophos Mit-
teilung of 24 October 2006
21   This is an argument in favor of continuing the reform of EU 
competition rules; see „Modernisation of EC antitrust enforcement 
rules; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 and the modernisation 
package,“  Directorate-General  of  Competition,  Brussels-Luxem-
bourg, 2004. In particular, the review process in Article 82 should 
give more attention to the unique features of platform competition 
and innovation competition in converging markets; cf. the relevant 
website  of  the  EU  Commission:  ec.europa.eu/comm/competiti-
on/antitrust/art82/index.html.
Figure 3:
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operating system and security components, typically 
creates  asymmetrical  competitive  relationships  be-
tween  participants  in  the  various  markets  affected 
by the convergence process. Since the competitive 
situation in such a market and the emerging market 
structures cannot be reliably predicted, competition 
policymakers would be well-advised to show restraint. 
Such a course is not inconsistent with ensuring that 
independent software providers have fair access to 
the operating system.
From  the  consumer’s  perspective,  a  low-cost, 
high-performance  operating  system  offering  com-
prehensive protection from unwanted threats is high-
ly desirable. This consideration should serve as an 
important guideline for competition policymakers in 
choosing when to intervene in the market. Instead of 
ad hoc intervention in the highly complex standard 
software markets, a clear system of rules should be 
created for all market participants. The regulation of 
electronic communications services can serve as a 
model for this purpose.22 In that case, the need for 
intervention due to rapidly changing competitive re-
lationships in the network industries is regularly ex-
amined through routine inspections of the regulatory 
framework.23 Due to the specific circumstances pre-
vailing in standard software markets, one might even 
consider whether those markets would be more ef-
ficiently governed by a special section of competition 
policy newly created for the purpose, which would 
better reflect their specific combination of technolo-
gies.
22    Cf.  Stumpf,  U.:  Exante  Regulierung:  Weiterentwicklung  oder 
erneuter Paradigmenwechsel? WIK-Newsletter, Bad Honnef, 2006, 
and the study commissioned by the EU Commission conducted 
by Caves, M., Stumpf, U., Velletti, T.: A Review of Certain Markets 
Included in the Commission‘s Recommendation on Relevant Mar-
kets Subject to ex ante Regulation, WIK, Bad Honnef, July 2006
23   Cf. Gual, J., et al: An Economic Approach to Article 82, Re-
port by the Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy, July 
2005, www.diamondintelligence.com/download/files/epgcp_july_
21_05.pdf.